GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Faculty Scholarship

2008

Constitutional Change and Responsibilities of Governance
Pertaining to the Faith-Based and Community Initiative
Ira C. Lupu
George Washington University Law School

Robert W. Tuttle
George Washington University Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Constitutional Change and Responsibilities of Governance Pertaining to the
Faith-Based and Community Initiative at Conference on Innovations in Effective Compassion (June,
2008).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND RESPONSIBILITIES
OF GOVERNANCE PERTAINING TO THE FAITH-BASED
AND COMMUNITY INITIATIVE
Ira C. Lupu
Robert W. Tuttle
Thirty years ago, a governmental initiative designed to encourage the participation of houses of
worship in government-financed social services would have been unthinkable. At that time,
many faith-based social welfare providers received public funding, but those providers were
generally large, highly secularized entities (Monsma, 1996; Saperstein, 2003). For years,
prominent religious denominations had chosen to deliver social services through separately
incorporated and specialized entities, such as Catholic Charities and Lutheran Social Services.
This service delivery structure permitted social service professionals to carry out their functions
without day-to-day oversight by religious leaders. The structure also insulated houses of worship
from the responsibilities and potential liabilities associated with the delivery of social services.
As a constitutional matter, the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, which provides that
“Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion,” stood as an impediment
to government financing of houses of worship and other institutions that engaged in religious
instruction. The Supreme Court had interpreted the Clause to prohibit government funds from
flowing directly to “pervasively sectarian” entities (Hunt v. McNair, 1973), a category that
encompassed houses of worship, religious elementary and secondary schools, and colleges with a
strong religious identity.
Between 1988 and 2000, however, the relevant constitutional law shifted, and policies on public
aid to faith-based service providers began to follow suit. In Bowen v. Kendrick (1988), the
Supreme Court upheld legislation that explicitly allowed religious organizations to receive
funding as service providers for a program aimed at adolescent sexuality. Following the Bowen
decision, courts started to relax the constitutional restrictions governing expenditures to religious
entities. Themes of equal access to public resources by religious actors began to emerge in the
legal and political culture, as exemplified by the Charitable Choice provisions of the welfare
reform legislation, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996. These provisions include (1) a mandate on participating states to treat religious entities on
the same basis as secular service providers, (2) a promise that participating religious
organizations can retain their religious character and identity, (3) a requirement that all providers
respect the religious liberty of beneficiaries, (4) a prohibition on direct government funding of
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“sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization,” and (5) an affirmation that participating
religious organizations retain their right to make religion-based employment decisions.
When George W. Bush began his presidency, the legal ban on grants to pervasively sectarian
entities had been effectively eliminated (Mitchell v. Helms, 2000). The Supreme Court’s decision
in the Cleveland school voucher case (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002), which upheld against
constitutional challenge a program of voucher-based financial support for education in private
schools (some with a strong religious identity), paved the way for greater latitude in the
involvement of faith-based organizations in government-financed programs. Nevertheless,
important constitutional restrictions on government support for religious activity remain in
effect.
Immediately on taking office in January 2001, President Bush issued executive orders that set in
motion the Faith-Based and Community Initiative (FBCI) (Exec. Orders 13,198–13,199). These
orders created the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (WHOFBCI)
and established centers for this initiative in the most prominent grant-making agencies in the
federal government. The President ordered the agency centers to find and eliminate unnecessary
obstacles to the participation of faith-based and community organizations in governmentfinanced social services. In 2003 and thereafter, these agencies promulgated a series of
regulations designed to eliminate such impediments and ensure the equal treatment of religious
organizations seeking to partner with federal or state agencies in the delivery of social services.
For example, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued a regulation
focused on the equal treatment of religious organizations that participate in the agency’s funding
programs, and many federal agencies have similar regulations (for additional examples, see the
Table of Legal Materials in Appendix A).
From the beginning of this effort, however, the FBCI has faced the formidable task of translating
a set of emerging constitutional principles into workable regulatory concepts. This initiative rests
on a premise of neutrality or nondiscrimination between secular and religious providers; in other
words, faith-based providers are equal to secular service providers in eligibility to participate in
the delivery of government-financed services. But the relevant constitutional law still embodies
remnants of a premise in tension with complete neutrality; namely, religious activities are
constitutionally different from secular activities, even if both are undertaken for the same public
purposes. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment continues to impose constraints on
public financing of religious activity, and many state constitutions have similar limitations.
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The existing literature on the legal parameters surrounding the FBCI has tended to take one of
two forms. Much of the literature emphasizes the social, religious, cultural, political, and
administrative milieus in which this initiative developed, and does not delve deeply into legal
considerations (Monsma, 1996; Farris, Nathan, & Wright, 2004; Ryden & Polet, 2005; DiIulio,
2007). More traditional legal literature either defends the FBCI’s basic premise of “the level
playing field” (Esbeck, 1997) or is critical of the initiative for being insensitive to traditional
concerns of church-state separation (Saperstein, 2003; Gilman, 2002, 2007a).
However, a more comprehensive approach to legal analysis of the FBCI focuses on the rate and
direction of legal change in the relevant constitutional norms, the details of the implementation
to the Initiative and the constitutional constraints that surround the FBCI, and the litigation
associated with this Initiative (Lupu & Tuttle, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2007).
This paper addresses the regulatory response of various government agencies to the relationship
between the FBCI’s agenda and the changing legal environment. After briefly mapping the key
developmental points in the relevant constitutional law, the discussion focuses on the particulars
of regulatory language as put into place by the agencies of the U.S. government and considers
the litigation efforts that have occurred in conjunction with this initiative. Some of the litigation
may be traced, at least in part, to inadequacies in the FBCI’s regulatory reform. In addition, the
paper provides recommendations for federal and state regulatory language that could be used to
facilitate the FBCI while keeping it within constitutional bounds. The paper does not
systematically evaluate the less formal documents and processes on which the federal
government frequently relies to guide grant recipients.
THE EVOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The regulatory reforms and the litigation challenges prompted by the FBCI can best be
understood in light of the evolving principles of First Amendment law. For over six decades, the
Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to
impose some constraints on public financing of religious entities (Everson v. Board of Ewing
Township, 1947). Although the interpretive details have changed, the Court’s guiding principle
throughout has been that the government may not promote or directly subsidize religious
worship or instruction in a particular faith. When the government engages in or directly supports
religious indoctrination, it violates the core understanding of the First Amendment ban on
“establishment of religion.” This prohibition, called the “no-indoctrination” principle, is
absolute. Unlike other values protected by the First Amendment, the ban on religious
establishment is never balanced against the social benefits that would arise from a violation of
the principle. Many state constitutions have similar limitations (Lupu & Tuttle, 2002).
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From the early 1970s until the late 1990s, the Supreme Court implemented that principle with a
sharply defined rule that government could not make direct grants to “pervasively sectarian”
entities, such as houses of worship, religious schools, and even social welfare organizations that
had an overtly religious character. The Court reasoned that grants to such organizations would
inevitably support the mission of religious indoctrination because the government was incapable
of ensuring that the organization would use public funds solely for secular activities.
Between 1981 and 2002, however, three new and highly relevant constitutional principles
emerged. The first principle involves the Court’s gradual abandonment of the overly broad rule
that pervasively sectarian entities may not participate in social welfare programs and replacement
of that rule with a narrower no-indoctrination rule that the government may not directly finance
religious activities (Agostini v. Felton, 1997; Mitchell v. Helms, 2000). At the heart of this shift
is the Court’s determination that faith-based entities will not inevitably divert public resources to
serve their religious mission, but instead may be trusted to comply with restrictions on how
public aid may be used. Such trust is conditional; the Court ruled in Mitchell that aid to religious
entities must incorporate adequate safeguards, including monitoring, against the diversion of
public funds to religious use.
The second principle concerns “beneficiary choice.” When the funding program is structured to
permit beneficiaries a genuine and independent choice among secular and religious providers,
and public funds are directed to the provider only as a result of such choices by beneficiaries,
religious organizations may use these funds for religious indoctrination as an element of the
relevant service (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002). For example, school voucher programs may
permit participating schools to include prayer or religious instruction as an element of the
education of voucher students, so long as students and their families have a genuine choice
among religious and secular schools and schools only receive funds as a result of the exercise of
such a choice. This financing structure is typically labeled indirect funding because of the role of
the beneficiary as an intermediary in distribution of public funds to religious entities. Programs
that fall under the principle of beneficiary choice thus are outside the scope of the noindoctrination principle because the beneficiary, rather than the government, is responsible for
any religious indoctrination that occurs within the funded program.
The third principle involves contexts in which the government is providing a forum for speech
rather than grants for the performance of services; in such situations the Court began to
recognize claims of nondiscrimination, or equal access, by religious persons or causes (Widmar
v. Vincent, 1981; Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 1993;
Rosenberger v. Univ. of Virginia, 1995; Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 2001).
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Supporters of the FBCI embrace this principle of equal access and argue that it should be
extended to public grants and other forms of financial support. In Locke v. Davey (2004),
however, the Court ruled that, even in a beneficiary choice program, states have broad discretion
in choosing whether or not to provide financial support for religious activity. Thus, in programs
involving public expenditures for services, a policy of equal access is constitutionally
permissible, but not constitutionally mandatory.
Unless the three principles are understood in a textured and interactive way, there are deep and
ineradicable tensions among them. An unmodified principle of equal access seems at first glance
to fully support the premise, central to the FBCI, that government grant programs should provide
a level playing field for competition among religious and secular service providers. Moreover, an
unadorned principle of beneficiary choice appears to suggest that the government may support
social service with religious content to beneficiaries who voluntarily select that kind of service,
so long as the government provides an adequate range of religious and secular options to
beneficiaries.
The no-indoctrination principle, however, constrains the scope of the equal access principle by
prohibiting the government from directly financing programs that include explicitly religious
content. Moreover, the no-indoctrination principle is not limited to cases of involuntary or
coercive religious experience. Because the government may not directly pay to indoctrinate even
those who freely seek such an experience, beneficiary choice programs must involve beneficiary
control over the direction of funds as well as genuine choice among secular and religious service
providers.
Constitutionally appropriate administration of the FBCI thus depends in significant ways on (1) a
nuanced appreciation of the three principles, (2) identification of areas of reconciliation among
them, and (3) careful guidance to both government grantors and potential grantees about these
cross-cutting constitutional parameters.
REGULATORY REFORM AND THE IMPERFECT MESH
WITH CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Among the very first official acts of President Bush were his two executive orders, issued
January 29, 2001, designed to create an active administrative presence for the FBCI. These
orders created WHOFBCI (E.O. 13,199) and the FBCI centers within each of the six major
grant-making agencies of the federal government (E.O. 13,198). Both orders emphasized the
principle of equal access by affirming the concepts of a level playing field and evenhandedness
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among religious and secular organizations. Neither order explicitly referenced the constraint
imposed by the no-indoctrination principle or the opportunities created by the beneficiary choice
principle. One of the chief purposes of both orders was the elimination of “unnecessary
legislative, regulatory, and other bureaucratic barriers that impede effective faith-based and other
community efforts to solve social problems.”
In 2001–2002, the main sticking point in the congressional deliberations on legislation related to
the FBCI was the issue of religious selectivity in hiring by publicly supported religious entities
(Farris, Nathan, & Wright, 2004). Many supporters of the FBCI wanted to reaffirm that such
organizations would retain their current exemption, codified in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, from the prohibition on religious discrimination in employment. Others, including some
who supported most of the FBCI principles, believed that faith-based entities should not be able
to limit publicly financed jobs to members of their own faith. Still others feared that the FBCI
would lead to violations of the no-indoctrination principle or that the mission of religious entities
would be compromised if they accepted public funds.
On December 12, 2002, the President acted unilaterally with an executive order entitled “Equal
Protection of the Laws for Faith-Based and Community Organizations.” This order made the key
principles of the FBCI applicable to all federal programs of social welfare funding.
In 2003–2004, through the coordination of WHOFBCI and the FBCI agency centers, all of the
major granting agencies promulgated a set of regulations designed to guide the participation of
faith-based organizations in the grant-making process. These regulatory reforms (see the Table
of Legal Materials in Appendix A) have achieved three substantial successes. First, the
regulations have clarified that houses of worship and other entities with a strong religious
identity are eligible to receive public grants as social welfare service providers. Prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Mitchell v. Helms (2000), which effectively eliminated the
exclusion of pervasively sectarian entities from direct government funding, the eligibility of such
organizations had been in doubt. These sets of regulations specify that participating
organizations have a right to retain their religious character, including the display of religious
icons, the selection of a governing board on a religious basis, and the inclusion of religious
references in their mission statements.
Second, the regulations provide that service beneficiaries have the right to be free from religious
coercion or discrimination in federally financed activity. No prior U.S. statute or regulation
prohibited federal grantees from engaging in discrimination against beneficiaries based on
religious identity or on the beneficiaries’ willingness to participate in religious activity. This is a
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very important development, although respect for these rights could be enhanced through an
affirmative obligation of faith-based grantees to inform beneficiaries of the protections. HHS
regulations for substance abuse treatment services provide an example of such a notice.
Third, the regulations address the responsibility of all grantees with respect to the use of
government funds to support religious activities. Nearly all federal agencies involved in the
FBCI now have in place a regulation prohibiting the direct financing of “inherently religious
activities, such as religious worship, instruction, or proselytization.” Grantees may engage in
such activities only with private funds, and must separate those activities in time or place from
activities directly funded by the government. These content restrictions have been reinforced by
a variety of guidance documents and training materials developed by the WHOFBCI and federal
agencies.
The emphasis on the concept of “inherently religious activities,” however, may have produced an
ambiguity in the regulatory environment. The concept of inherently religious activities is derived
from Bowen v. Kendrick (1988) where the Court ruled that services related to adolescent
sexuality were not “inherently religious” because such services could be performed with
exclusively secular content. Thus, the FBCI’s ban on direct funding for inherently religious
activities is accurate to a point because the no-indoctrination principle bars public support for
worship, religious instruction, and proselytizing. But the regulations do not confront the question
of whether social services that have explicitly religious content are precluded by the regulation.
If understood too narrowly, the regulatory proscription on direct government financing of
religious instruction significantly understates the no-indoctrination principle, which bars direct
government financing of any activity with “specifically religious content” (Bowen v. Kendrick,
1988).
We believe the existing regulatory formula creates ambiguity with respect to direct funding of
social services that have religious content. Some social services may be delivered using religious
content, even if such content is not a necessary part of the service. For example, a grantee may
teach the skills and behaviors necessary for success in the workplace, the value of marriage, the
benefits of sexual abstinence outside of marriage, or the benefits of a drug-free lifestyle. The
provision of these services may be in entirely secular terms or in terms that include explicitly
religious language and beliefs. While it is possible that federal officials might provide sufficient
warning and guidance, the regulations themselves do not warn grantors and grantees that the
inclusion of specifically religious content in the delivery of such services may put the granting
agency in conflict with the no-indoctrination principle and expose both the public grantor and the
private grantee to legal consequences.
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At times, federal agencies have provided appropriate explanation that the prohibition on direct
funding of “religious instruction” includes social service materials that contain religious content.
For example, earlier this year, the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) issued a
memorandum to grantees under the Healthy Marriage Initiative. The memorandum explained
that curricular materials must be “neutral with respect to religion,” and provided examples of
curricula that would not qualify for direct government support because the materials included
religious content. Another example of appropriate guidance can be found in the recent
memorandum—issued by ACF in the wake of the settlement in ACLU of Massachusetts v.
Leavitt—on the proper and improper ways to spend grant funds for programs that promote sexual
abstinence by minors.
An additional, though related, ambiguity may arise from the regulatory guarantee that faith-based
organizations may receive grants and still retain their religious character. Even though the
regulations define “religious character” in terms associated with organizational identity
(acceptability of religious board members, maintenance of religious content in mission
statement, etc), it is possible that organizations may misinterpret the guarantee as a
representation that religious content in their government-financed services is acceptable if such
content reflects the entity’s religious character.
The ambiguity of the regulatory focus on “inherently religious activities” is especially
problematic when applied to the direct funding of social services that aim at personal
transformation. If faith-based social service agencies deliver food, shelter, or other material
goods, it is usually not difficult for them to segregate those goods from religious activity and to
ensure that government funds do not pay for the latter. In such a context, government funds can
be used exclusively to support secular goods and services, and religious activity can be offered,
as the federal regulations uniformly require, at a “separate time or place” not subsidized by
government funds. In contrast, transformative services, such as those aimed at substance abuse,
sexual abstinence among unmarried minors, and rehabilitation of those incarcerated for crime,
may be much harder to segregate into secular and religious components. Most of the successful
litigation (discussed below) against government-financed faith-based services has arisen in the
context of transformative services.
Uncertainty about the constitutionally acceptable use of direct grants also presents a difficult
problem in the context of grants designed to build the capacity of faith-based organizations to
provide social services. Such grants have been a central building block of the FBCI through the
Compassion Capital Fund (CCF). Depending on the activities funded by the capacity-building
grants, it can be difficult to segregate secular and religious activities. If a recipient of such grants
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provides both religious and secular services, aid for building the organization’s capacity—
through computer technology, for example—is likely to benefit the organization’s religious
programs as well as its secular programs, thus making the aid vulnerable to constitutional
challenge. The one decided case on the subject upheld a capacity-building grant to a marriagestrengthening program, but did so only in light of a specific finding that the grantee had removed
the religious content from all the activities that benefited from federal support for the grantee’s
capacity. (Christianson v. Leavitt, 2007). Thus, the public funding for capacity-building
supported exclusively secular services.
Moreover, CCF grants often involve private intermediaries empowered by the government to
make subgrants. The Supreme Court has ruled that, like the government, these subgrantors are
prohibited from directly subsidizing religious indoctrination (Bowen v. Kendrick, 1988). In the
early years of the FBCI, the federal agencies may not have been sufficiently sensitive to the
problems of necessary guidance for either intermediaries or subgrantees. The concern remains
that the federal regulations have generally repeated the formula by which direct grants may not
be used for inherently religious activities.
An additional concern related to the current regulations is the existing legal requirement that the
government monitor the content of government-financed social services provided by faith-based
entities. The Supreme Court has ruled that such monitoring, which should not and need not be
intrusive, is necessary to ensure compliance with the no-indoctrination principle; that is, to
protect against unlawful diversion of public money to religious activity (Mitchell v. Helms, 2000;
Agostini v. Felton, 1997). While the grantees are subject to the same federal or state monitoring
imposed on any grantee, the current FBCI regulations prohibit the imposition of any requirement
that faith-based organizations be treated differently than secular organizations for purposes of
regulatory compliance. Although the emphasis on equal treatment is salutary, the regulations
may not adequately highlight the government’s continuing constitutional obligation to provide
particularized monitoring that focuses on the risk of diversion of public funds to religious
activities. In a 2006 study of programs that provide funding for faith-based and community
organizations, the Government Accountability Office found that federal agencies gave auditors
little guidance in assessing whether grantees complied with restrictions on use of direct funds for
religious activities (GAO, 2006).
Even with respect to indirect funding, where constitutional restrictions are looser and room for
inclusion of religious content correspondingly greater, federal programs could provide better
regulatory language for government officials and faith-based grantees. Apart from regulations
implementing statutory Charitable Choice provisions, regulations promulgated by the federal
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agencies do not define indirect funding. Instead, the agency-wide FBCI regulations proscribe
certain religious content in situations of direct funding and indicate that such a proscription does
not apply to a program of indirect funding.
Although this omission has not appeared to cause the same degree of uncertainty as the
proscription on direct financing of inherently religious activities, potential grantors and grantees
could benefit from specific regulations with respect to indirect funding. (Some agencies have
developed detailed resources that provide clarity about the constitutional parameters of indirect
funding. See for example the Department of Labor (2005) resource “Partnering with Integrity.”)
The phrase “indirect funding” is drawn from the Cleveland school voucher decision (Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 2002) and other Supreme Court cases involving policies that empower
individual beneficiaries to select a religious entity as the provider of publicly supported services
(Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 1993; Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Services for the Blind,
1986). The Court’s decisions upholding such programs emphasized the ability of beneficiaries to
make a “genuine and independent choice” among secular and religious alternatives. Thus far, the
agency-wide FBCI regulations for implementing programs of beneficiary choice have only
indicated that the programs must offer beneficiaries a choice to which the beneficiaries do not
have religious objections. Those regulations have not taken the constitutionally mandated next
step of requiring that voucher programs offer a religiously neutral menu of service providers,
including a secular alternative.
Moreover, federal regulations have not yet made clear the requirement that indirect aid must in
some fashion pass through the control of the beneficiary, though not necessarily by the
mechanism of vouchers or other tangible instruments (Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.
v. McCallum, 2003). In other words, the concept of beneficiary choice means more than the
simple fact of voluntary selection by beneficiaries among a number of providers. The regulations
should state that the beneficiary must be empowered to designate the provider as a recipient of
government funds and to stop the flow of those funds by withdrawing from that provider.
In addition, the regulations might fruitfully sharpen the concept of beneficiary choice by greater
attention to particular service contexts. What may constitute an adequate mechanism for choice
when parents choose elementary or secondary schools (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002) may
be insufficient when the relevant service involves people suffering from drug addiction, with
accompanying impairment of cognitive capacity, or institutionalized foster care of minor
children arranged by state officials (Teen Ranch, Inc. v. Udow, 2007). In cases of the latter type,

272

involving state officials rather than parents acting on behalf of minors, it may be that no one is
competent to exercise beneficiary choice in favor of religious programming.
Finally, despite substantial efforts to involve the states in the efforts associated with the FBCI,
the regulatory analysis and communication of various legal doctrines of federalism could be
improved for this initiative. For example, federal agencies have at times confusingly explained
the relationship between federal law and state law, especially with respect to the highly
controversial issue of religious selectivity in hiring by faith-based organizations. An exemption
from federal restrictions on faith-based hiring does not automatically create an exemption for
federal grantees from state law restrictions on faith-based hiring decisions.
Moreover, the states themselves—even those with their own active faith-based and community
initiatives—generally have not taken on the necessary task of supplying state-level regulatory
content to granting agencies and potential grantees. To be successful at the state and local levels,
the FBCI needs to include a legal and bureaucratic program designed to institutionalize its
premises. Whether the cause is legal uncertainty or bureaucratic inertia, the states, which are the
locus of most grant-making activity, have made virtually no progress in developing their own
regulatory frameworks, even with respect to specific questions raised by state constitutional law.
In some states, these state constitutional questions are substantial and include limits on the use of
even indirect public aid for religious activity (Lupu & Tuttle, 2002).
THE LITIGATION SURGE
PRODUCED BY THE FBCI
Concerns about regulatory precision and transparency are not merely academic. Since the
inception of the FBCI, government funding of faith-based social services has generated a
significant volume of litigation and there has been a considerable increase in the number of
lawsuits and judicial decisions about publicly financed, faith-based social services in the past
6 years. Most of these lawsuits have been initiated by public interest groups that are committed
to strong principles of church-state separation (see the Table of FBCI-Related Litigation in
Appendix B). Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. (FFRF) has been the most active
instigator of this sort of litigation. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, the
American Civil Liberties Union, the American Jewish Congress, and other groups have played a
similar role.
The Table of FBCI-Related Litigation lists all of the cases brought so far, categorized by
outcome: Victories for Challengers to Government Action (7), Victories for Defenders of
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Government Action (9), Settlements and other Terminations Before Decision (7), and Lawsuits
Still Pending (2). These cases involve a wide variety of social services, including treatment for
substance abuse, sexual abstinence for unmarried minors, work training, prisoner rehabilitation,
mentoring the children of prisoners, education in pastoral care for nurses, custodial foster care
for troubled teenagers, chaplaincies for public employees and patients in public hospitals, and the
provision of shelter for the homeless. In a few of these cases early in the FBCI, the evidence
suggested that the grantee had received inadequate guidance, which led to settlements in favor of
the challengers or judicial rulings against the government (see, for example, FFRF v. Montana
Office of Rural Health, 2004; ACLU of Massachusetts v. Leavitt, 2006).
An elaborate body of law has now developed on the subject of partnerships between government
and faith-based organizations in the delivery of social services, although few lawyers are aware
of this as a defined field. Most of the victories and favorable settlements for the challengers to
government action and several of the government victories as well (Teen Ranch v. Udow, 2007;
Christianson v. Leavitt, 2007) have involved a strong invocation of the no-indoctrination
principle. If grantees use direct government support to finance the interweaving of religious
themes with social services, they invite successful lawsuits against the grantor and themselves.
All lower court decisions have upheld the importance of this prohibition on government-financed
indoctrination. In sharp contrast, the government has typically prevailed in suits asserting other
kinds of claims, such as unsuccessful allegations of unlawful preference for religious over
secular entities (FFRF v. Towey, 2005), unlawful religious discrimination in hiring (Lown v.
Salvation Army, 2005), or improper structures of indirect financing (FFRF v. McCallum, 2003;
American Jewish Congress v. Corporation for National and Community Service, 2005).
In June 2007, the Supreme Court decided an important case that challenged the general policies
of the FBCI rather than specific grants made under it. In Hein v. Freedom from Religion
Foundation, Inc., the Court ruled that federal taxpayers lacked standing to complain about the
constitutionality of discretionary expenditures made by federal executive agencies to promote the
FBCI. The Hein ruling rests on a distinction between legislative decisions to make expenditures
explicitly in support of religious causes or entities and discretionary executive decisions to spend
in service of these same ends. Taxpayers may now challenge in the federal courts only spending
decisions that have been explicitly authorized by legislatures. The Hein decision may well slow
the pace of challenges to particular grants under the FBCI because some of these grants are not
made pursuant to explicit legislative authority; however, Hein will not eliminate such challenges
(Lupu & Tuttle, 2008).
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IMPLICATIONS
The FBCI resides in a constitutional and regulatory milieu that requires detailed regulations and
careful guidance to be provided to grantors and grantees. Federal agencies have made some
progress in this regard, but more needs to be done. This analysis leads to a number of
recommendations that may facilitate a more administratively successful integration of the FBCI
with the present contours of the relevant law:
1. The regulations should be revised to clarify the full scope of the prohibition on direct
funding of activity that has explicitly religious content. Such clarification will be
most useful if it specifically identifies situations, such as faith-intensive treatment
programs for substance abuse, in which grantees are likely to run afoul of the noindoctrination principle.
2. Federal agencies should expand their regulatory concern to indirect financing, with
particular attention to the adequacy of secular alternatives and the precise
mechanisms of beneficiary choice.
3. Federal agencies should provide greater clarity about the relationship between federal
and state law, especially regarding the preemptive (or nonpreemptive) effect of
exemption from federal policies of nondiscrimination in employment.
4. Federal agencies should impose a constitutionally sensitive system of monitoring to
ensure that grantees do not divert funds to religious activities.
5. Federal agencies should continue to provide improved guidance for private
intermediaries, especially with respect to capacity-building grants.
6. Federal agencies should continue to make the protections for beneficiaries more
robust, by requiring providers to inform beneficiaries that they have the right not to
participate in religious activities and that their right to receive services does not
depend on such participation.
7. States and localities should continue to undertake efforts to educate grant officers and
grantees, actual and prospective, concerning the relevant restrictions under both state
and federal constitutional law.
If these recommendations are implemented, it is likely that fewer lawsuits will be filed
challenging grants to faith-based organizations, more grantors and grantees will be willing to
participate actively in the FBCI, and the rights of beneficiaries will be fully protected. Under
such conditions, the attractive promise of a level playing field for religious and secular
organizations, and the rich involvement of both, can be realized in ways that are consistent with
constitutional norms and traditions.
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APPENDIX A:
TABLE OF LEGAL MATERIALS
Legislative and Regulatory Materials
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, Pub. L.. No. 104-193, 110 Stat.
2105 (codified as amended in various sections of 42 U.S.C., including 42 U.S.C. sec. 604a et
seq. (1996)
Exec. Order 13,198, 3 C.F.R. 750 (2002)
Exec. Order 13,199, 3 C.F.R. 752 (2002)
Exec. Order 13,279, 3 C.F.R. 258 (2003)
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Equal Opportunity for Religious Organizations, 7 C.F.R. Part
16 (2004)
U.S. Department of Education, Participation in Education Department Programs by Religious
Organizations; Providing for Equal Treatment of all Education Program Participants, 34 C.F.
R. Parts 74, 75, 76, and 80 (2004)
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Participation in Department of Health & Human
Services Programs by Religious Organizations; Providing for Equal Treatment of all
Department of Health & Human Services Program Participants, 45 C.F.R. Parts 74, 87, 92, and
96 (2004)
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Equal Participation of Treatment for
Faith-Based Organizations, 24 C.F.R. Parts 5 and 570 (2004)
U.S. Agency for International Development, Participation by Religious Organizations in U.S.
AID Programs, 22 C.F.R. Parts 202, 205, 211, and 226 (2004)
U.S. Department of Justice, Equal Treatment for Faith-Based Organizations, 28 C.F.R. 38.1–
38.2 (2004)
U.S. Department of Labor, Equal Treatment in Department of Labor Programs for Religious
Organizations; Protection of Religious Liberty pf Department of Labor Social Service Providers
and Beneficiaries, 29 C.F.R.2.2.32 (2004)
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, VA Homeless Providers Grant and Per Diem Program;
Religious Organizations, 38 C.F.R. Part 61 (2004)
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Selected Administrative Resources
Government Accountability Office, Faith-Based and Community Initiative: Improvements in
Monitoring Grantees and Measuring Performance Could Enhance Accountability (2006)
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Administration for Children & Families, Office
of Family Assistance, “Curricular Use and Compliance with 45 CFR Part 87” (January 23, 2008)
U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, “Training and
Employment Guidance Letter 1-05” (July 6, 2005)
White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, Guidance to Faith-Based and
Community Organizations on Partnering with the Federal Government (2006)
White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, Promoting Equal Treatment: A
Guide for State & Local Compliance with Federal Regulations (2006)
Decided Cases
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988)
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. McCallum, 324 F. 3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003)
Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001)
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007)
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973)
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993)
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004)
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000)
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)
Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986)
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002)
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993)
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APPENDIX B:
TABLE OF FBCI-RELATED LITIGATION
Victories for Challengers to Government Action
Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 509 F.3d
406, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit, 2007 (affirming the invalidation of faith-based
prison program, though reversing an order that Prison Fellowship Ministries repay the State of
Iowa for unconstitutional programming)
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation v. Blanco, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 74590, U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, 2007 (invalidating earmarked grants, without
specified purposes or safeguards against diversion to religious activities, to named houses of
worship)
Community House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 463 F.3d 1118, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Cir.
2006 (affirming decision invalidating below-market lease from city to operator of homeless
shelter because operator was engaged in religious indoctrination and sex discrimination)
Bush v. Holmes, 919 S. 2d 392, Supreme Court of Florida, 2006 (invalidating, on state
constitutional grounds, a voucher scheme for sending children to private schools, religious and
secular)
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Towey, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 39444, U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, 2005 (invalidating HHS grant to MentorKids USA
because of religious content in the services provided)
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Montana Office of Rural Health, 2004 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 29139, U.S. District Court for the District of Montana, 2004 (invalidating grants for the
support of education in the practice of religion-based parish nursing)
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. McCallum & Faith Works Milwaukee, 179 F.
Supp.2d 950, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, 2002 (invalidating grant
for the direct support of faith-based residential service for the treatment of substance-addicted
welfare recipients)
Victories for Defenders of Government Action
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007) (dismissing taxpayer
challenge to executive expenditures promoting the FBCI)
Teen Ranch, Inc. v. Udow, 479 F.3d 403, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, 2007
(affirming a decision upholding the exclusion from state assistance of faith-based residential
service facility for teens with problems of substance abuse)
Christianson v. Leavitt, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1237, Secretary of Health & Human Services, U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington, 2007 (dismissing suit against capacity-
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building grant by HHS to faith-based marriage support group, on the grounds that the grant
supported only secular activity)
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Nicholson, Secretary of the Department of Veterans’
Administration, 469 F. Supp. 2d 609, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin,
2007 (dismissing suit against hospital chaplaincy program of the Department of Veterans’
Administration)
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Towey, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 39444, U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, 2005 (upholding, against claim of religious
discrimination, subgrants from Emory University to faith-based health providers)
Lown v. Salvation Army, Inc., & Commissioner, New York City Administration for Children’s
Services, 393 F. Supp. 2d 223, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2005
(dismissing claim that religious selectivity in employment, by publicly supported Salvation
Army, violated federal or state law)
American Jewish Congress v. Corporation for National and Community Service, 399 F.3d 351,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir., 2005 (rejecting constitutional challenge
to system of indirect public financing for training of teachers placed at religious schools in
AmeriCorps program)
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880, U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 7th Cir. 2003 (rejecting constitutional challenge to indirect payment for placement of drug
offenders at faith-based residential treatment center for substance abuse)
American Jewish Congress v. Bost, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, 2002
(refusing to order restitution of public funds by operator of faith-based jobs program that had
unlawfully used public monies for support of religious activity)
Settlements and other Terminations Before Decision
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Mitchell Roob, U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana, 2007 (withdrawal of suit after state terminated the employment of a chaplain
hired to minister to employees of state social service department)
Geneva College v. Chao, Secretary of Labor, U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania, 2007 (suit alleging unlawful interference with college’s religious autonomy in
hiring settled after state and federal authorities withdrew objection to college’s use of publicly
supported employment search Web site)
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Alberto Gonzales, U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin, 2006 (withdrawal of suit after U.S. Department of Justice
suspended its request for proposals to provide faith-based programming in federal prisons)
American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts v. Leavitt, Secretary of Health & Human
Services, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Massachusetts, 2006 (settlement of suit
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against HHS for grant to “Silver Ring Thing,” a faith-based program promoting sexual
abstinence among unmarried teens)
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Minnesota Faith/Health Consortium, Alberto
Gonzales, U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, 2005 (withdrawal of suit after
University of Minnesota altered curriculum in its program on the relationship between faith and
health)
Bellmore v. Georgia Department of Human Resources & United Methodist Children’s Home,
Georgia Superior Court, 2004 (settlement of employment discrimination suit in light of revision
of state policy on religious discrimination in employment by state-supported faith-based
organizations)
American Civil Liberties Union of Louisiana v. Foster, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13778, U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, 2002 (preliminary injunction, followed by
settlement of suit against Governor of Louisiana with respect to program of state support for
faith-based programs promoting sexual abstinence among unmarried teens)
Lawsuits Still Pending
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Bjergaard & Dakota Boys and Girls Ranch, U.S.
District Court for the District of North Dakota, 2007 (suit alleging unlawful state support for
religion in faith-based group foster home)
Laskowski v. University of Notre Dame & Spellings, U.S. Secretary of Education, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 7th Circuit, appeal pending, 2008 (suit alleging unlawful subgrants of public
monies by University of Notre Dame to religiously affiliated colleges in federal program of
teacher training)
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